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RETHINKING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM TITLE
IX AFTER OBERGEFELL
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since same-sex marriage was legalized nationally in
the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges, the media has drawn
attention to a related issue facing the LGBT community:
discrimination in higher education.1 Educational institutions
that receive federal aid, or admit students who receive federal
aid, are required to comply with Title IX, a federal statute that
prohibits sex discrimination.2 In recent years, case law has
included “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in the
definition of “sex” under Title IX, and therefore under the
umbrella of Title IX protections.3
Title IX exempts religious educational institutions from
compliance with all of its requirements to protect First
Amendment rights.4 This religious exemption means that
religious educational institutions are legally permitted to
discriminate based on sex (now including sexual orientation
and gender identity). However, the actual process of granting
and applying religious exemptions, based on current Title IX
law, is complicated and uncertain. This has led many to ask if
the current system for religious exemptions from Title IX is
actually working effectively at protecting the rights of all
people, including those who identify as part of the LGBT
community.5
This Note explores the current laws and procedures for

1 Sarah Warbelow & Remington Gregg, Hidden Discrimination: Title IX
Religious Exemptions Putting LGBT Students at Risk, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec.
2015),
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Title_IX_Exemptions_Report.pdf.
2 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
3 Title IX Protections from Bullying and Harassment in Schools: FAQs for
LGBT or Gender Nonconforming Students and Their Families, NATIONAL WOMEN’S
LAW
CENTER
(Oct.
2012),
https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/lgbt_bullying_title_ix_fact_sheet.pdf.
4 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
5 Warbelow & Gregg, supra note 1.

249

Duchene.249-284.docx (Do Not Delete)

250

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/31/17 5:09 PM

[2017

granting religious exemptions under Title IX and evaluates 1)
whether they are working effectively and 2) if not, how they
could be improved to protect the rights of both religious groups
and LGBT students. Part II lays out the current law and
guidelines which specify how to obtain religious exemptions,
the application of these guidelines over time, and how they
have been applied to sexual orientation specifically. Part III
examines similar types of legislation that have attempted to
forge a compromise between religious freedoms and protections
for LGBT individuals, including language from the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”), the so-called
“Utah Compromise,” and anti-discrimination statutes in
California. Part IV compares the Title IX regulations explained
in Part II to the language in the employment discrimination
statutes described in Part III, in order to 1) identify problems
within the system for granting religious exemptions to
educational institutions and to 2) propose solutions to these
problems by drawing upon other proposed and enacted statutes
which balanced protections for both religious and LGBT
communities.
II.

TITLE IX REGULATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS

Congress passed Title IX in 1972 as part of the Higher
Education Amendments to prevent sex discrimination in higher
education in the United States.6 First, this Part will explore the
actual language of Title IX, including both the statutory
language prohibiting sex discrimination and the “unpublished”
language that explains which schools are entitled to a religious
exemption from Title IX and how they may obtain said
exemption. Then it will describe how this language has been
received over time and how it has impacted the granting of
religious exemptions. Finally, it will investigate how these
religious exemptions are actually granted today, especially in
the context of sexual orientation.
A. Title IX Language
Title IX explicitly states that no person shall be subjected to
any form of discrimination on the basis of sex “under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
6

20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
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assistance.”7 The statute also outlines an exception to this
clause: an educational institution is exempt when 1) it is
“controlled by a religious organization,” and 2) prohibiting sex
discrimination “would not be consistent with the religious
tenets of such [controlling] organization.”8
To determine when an educational institution is “controlled
by a religious organization” for the purpose of the exemption,
the government agency charged with Title IX enforcement—the
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”)—developed a “control test” for
internal use by OCR employees.9 Note that a religious
educational institution need meet only one of these
requirements to be considered to have a controlling religious
organization. The test states that an educational institution is
considered to be controlled by a religious organization when 1)
it is a “school or department of divinity,” 2) it “requires its
faculty, students or employees to be members of or otherwise
espouse a personal belief in, the religion of the [controlling]
organization,” or 3) its “charter . . . contains explicit statements
that it is controlled by a religious organization” or it is
“committed to the doctrines of a particular religion, the
members of its governing body are appointed by the controlling
religious organization, and it receives a significant amount of
financial support from the controlling religious organization.”10
Note that a religious educational institution need meet only
one of these requirements to be considered to have a controlling
religious organization.
This test originated in 1977 and has remained an internal
policy.11 Additionally, OCR employees who worked with
religious exemptions and Title IX were instructed not to
contact the purported controlling organizations because this
would be considered “too obtrusive” in gathering information
(most likely in response to First Amendment complaints).12
OCR treated the control test as a guideline rather than an

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3).
9 Assurance of Compliance with Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 42
Fed.
Reg.
15,141,
15,142–43
(Mar.
18,
1977),
https://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/fedreg/fr042/fr042053/fr042053.pdf.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 KAN. L. REV. 327,
371–74 (2016).
7
8
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actual rule.13
An internal OCR policy set forth a procedure by which an
educational institution could claim an exemption, stating that
it 1) “shall do so by submitting in writing to the Director a
statement by the highest ranking official of the institution” in
which it 2) identifies the specific provisions of Title IX which
“conflict with a specific tenet of the [controlling] religious
organization.”14 Note that this policy specifically uses the word
“claim” rather than the words “apply for,” as well as the fact
that the educational institution must specifically identify
which aspect of Title IX (“sex,” i.e. pregnancy status, sexual
orientation, etc.) conflicts with a specific tenet of the
institution’s controlling religious organization.
B. History and Criticism of Title IX Regulations
The actual procedure for granting exemptions differs
greatly from what one might intuit from the statutory
language. First, the historical application of the religious
exemption’s language suggests that there is some ambiguity as
to whether a religious educational institution is entitled to an
exemption simply by virtue of being a religious educational
institution (i.e. the exemption is self-executed), or whether it is
a constitutional right of OCR to require an application or proof
of claim prior to recognizing a religious exemption. Second, a
controlling organization is not really required. Third, an
explanation of a conflict between specific Title IX provisions
and specific tenets of the controlling religious organization is
not really required, nor is there any investigation into the
sincerity of the particular tenets put forth by the educational
institution.
There has been a long-standing battle between religious
educational institutions and OCR over the constitutionality of
the regulations and guidelines controlling religious exemptions
from Title IX requirements. As early as 1975, the American
Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and
Universities (“AAPICU”) and the U.S. Catholic Conference
claimed that having to apply for an exemption and be

Id.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,139 (June
4, 1975).
13
14
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evaluated by the government for eligibility was a violation of
the First Amendment on grounds of excessive government
entanglement with religion.15 The AAPICU suggested OCR
withdraw its Title IX claim procedure altogether and remove
any requirement that a religious institution must claim an
exemption or otherwise contact the government.16 The U.S.
Catholic Conference suggested a similar, less radical, proposal:
a self-certification procedure, in which the educational
institutions simply notify OCR that they would be claiming a
religious exemption from all or part of Title IX.17
OCR essentially adopted the U.S. Catholic Conference’s
self-certification suggestion from this point forward, though not
formally. Over two hundred claims were submitted to OCR by
various religious institutions over the next ten years, but OCR
did not respond to any of them.18 Then, in 1985, OCR took on
the massive task of responding to all of these claims within the
next nine months.19 Regional offices were instructed to use a
highly deferential standard of review, to the point that OCR
did not deny a single religious exemption request, and OCR
made little effort to review claims.20
Although religious exemptions have been controversial and
contested even by the educational institutions themselves, very
few students or employees have challenged an educational
institution’s eligibility for a Title IX exemption. One of the
exceptions is Petruska v. Gannon University, where a female
who was formerly a chaplain at a Catholic university claimed
that she was demoted and discharged because of her sex.21 She
had originally filed a claim under Title VII, and then amended

15 Sex
Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409
(1975); Review of Regulations to Implement Title IX of Public Law 92–138 Conducted
Pursuant to Sec. 431 of the General Education Provisions Act, 228 et seq, 588–91 (U.S.
GPO, Washington, 1975).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Ernest L. Wilkinson, Leonard J. Arrington & Bruce C. Hafen, Brigham Young
University: The First One Hundred Years 309–10 (vol. 4, 1976).
19 Id.
20 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12.
21 Amanda Bryk, Title IX Giveth and the Religious Exemption Taketh Away:
How the Religious Exemption Eviscerates the Protection Afforded Transgender Students
Under Title IX, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 751, 778–79 (2015); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462
F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006).
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to include a Title IX claim as well.22 The district court held that
her claim was barred by the “ministerial exception” under the
First Amendment.23 In order for courts to determine whether
an employee qualifies for a ministerial exception, the court
must use a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, based
primarily on the individual’s job description and function.24 So
while she might have had a valid claim under Title IX had it
been a different position of employment or had she been a
student, the court held that because the position in question
was a ministerial position, and because the ministerial
exception extended beyond the reach of Title VII to also apply
to Title IX—because it is a broad right guaranteed under the
First Amendment—she did not have a valid claim in this
particular case. This case demonstrates that 1) the ministerial
exception applies to Title IX, and 2) a religious educational
institution may receive a religious exemption to Title IX after a
discrimination suit is filed.
In fact, there are multiple examples of religious educational
institutions claiming a religious exemption after a Title IX
claim has already been brought against them.25 At George Fox
University (“GFU”), a Quaker institution, a transgender
student brought a Title IX claim against the university for
refusing to allow him to live in the all-male dormitory on
campus.26 After receiving this claim, GFU applied to OCR for a
religious
exemption
based
on
a
conflict
between
accommodating transgender students and its religious tenets
and received an exemption for its policies pertaining to campus
housing, restrooms, locker rooms, and athletics.27 This is not to
say that a case could not be successful if brought against a
religious educational institution for violation of Title IX prior to
the school claiming a religious exemption, but this sort of
challenge has not yet occurred. Thus far, in all Title IX cases
involving religious exemptions, the courts have presumed that
a religious exemption is automatically granted if the institution
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id.
24 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.
171, 172 (2012).
25 See Letter from Thomas E. Corts, President, Samford University to Assistant
Sec’y, Dep’t of Educ., c/o Mr. Archie B. Meyer, Sr., Regional Civil Rights Dir., Office for
Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 29, 1992).
26 Bryk, supra note 21, at 755.
27 Id.
22
23

Duchene.249-284.docx (Do Not Delete)

2]

RETHINKING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS

5/31/17 5:09 PM

255

meets the requirements, regardless of whether it has claimed
or applied for an exemption.
C. Application of Title IX
Perhaps even more important than understanding the
objections to religious exemptions under Title IX is
understanding how the language itself has been consistently
applied to educational institutions over time. Not a single
educational institution has ever been denied a religious
exemption from Title IX.28 There have been requests for more
information, a lack of response, and withdrawn applications;
but, never has OCR contacted an educational institution to
inform it that it did not meet the requirements for a religious
exemption.29 As mentioned above, there are two major
requirements that an educational institution must fulfill
according to OCR’s policy language: passing the control test
and providing the specific religious tenets which conflict with
the specific Title IX regulations.30
The control test has been applied very loosely. For example,
between 1975 and 1977, fifty-three Orthodox Jewish
educational institutions claimed the exemption, but did not list
a controlling organization in their claim.31 In simply stating
that they were religious institutions, OCR recognized each of
the fifty-three claims.32 Similarly, in 1985, an un-affiliated
Christian school, Berea College, claimed its Board of Trustees
as its controlling religious organization. OCR agreed and
granted the religious exemption.33 In fact, many Christian
schools did not identify a particular controlling religious
organization, using instead their Board of Directors or Board of
Trustees, statement of faith, or other type of justification to
receive their exemption.34 When schools explicitly stated that
they did not have a controlling religious organization, OCR

Warbelow & Gregg, supra note 1.
Augustine-Adams, supra note 12, at 374–75.
30 See supra part II.A.
31 Id. at 368–69.
32 Id.
33 Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for
Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., to John B. Stephenson, President, Berea Coll. 1 (Sept. 3,
1985),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/berea-collegeresponse-09031985.pdf.
34 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12, at 369.
28
29
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sought additional information to essentially posit a controlling
religious organization.35 Interestingly, OCR began using the
words “grant” and “request” with increasing frequency
beginning in 1975.36
Second, the requirement of identifying specific religious
tenets which conflict with Title IX has also been ignored in
many circumstances. The Orthodox Jewish schools mentioned
above were vague about what their religious tenets were and
how they conflicted with Title IX. The schools also claimed that
the First Amendment excused them from having to meet any of
the requirements set by OCR.37 The OCR then provided them
with an exemption.38
Similarly, Spring Arbor University, affiliated with the Free
Methodist Church, relied on its mission statement rather than
on Bible verses—a common practice among other religious
universities—to show that accommodation of transgender
students was inconsistent with the university’s religious
tenets.39 Again, OCR granted the religious exemption.40
Additionally, OCR never inquired into the sincerity of religious
beliefs or whether they are actually practiced by the controlling
religious organization (or claimed religious affiliate).41 While in
theory the government may examine the sincerity with which
claimants hold to their religious beliefs (in determining
whether an educational institution is eligible for a religious
Title IX exemption), some suggest this is not really possible in
practice.42 Additionally, OCR had received many past
complaints about infringing upon First Amendment rights with
its claim procedure, and likely was wary about doing anything
35 See Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to James A. Fischer, President, Kenrick Seminary 1 (Aug. 1, 1985),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/kenrick-seminaryresponse-08011985.pdf.
36 Letter from William S. Barker, President, Covenant Theological Seminary to
Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights 3 (Feb. 23, 1983).
37 Memorandum re Title IX Religious Exemptions from Harry M. Singleton,
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. to Reg’l Dirs., Regions I–X, Office for
Civil
Rights,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Educ.
(Aug.
2,
1985),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/singleton-memo-19850802.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Bryk, supra note 21, at 781.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 778.
42 See Frederick Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why
They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94–151
(2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657733.
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that might cause more backlash from religious groups and
educational institutions.43
In the history of the application of the Title IX religious
exemption, there are inconsistent opinions about the need to
apply for or a right to claim a religious exemption, a general
lack of investigation into the existence of a controlling religious
organization, and a consistent ignorance on the part of OCR as
to which specific tenets religious schools claim conflict with
which Title IX regulations. This is a somewhat short history,
because Title IX was passed in 1972, but its importance
continues to increase as LGBT issues come to the forefront of
the public eye.
D. Application of Title IX to Sexual Orientation
Discrimination
As mentioned above, the definition of “sex” in the context of
Title IX has been broadened to include discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy status, abortion, sexual orientation, gender
identity, and others.44 Sexual orientation was officially included
as part of the definition of “sex” under Title IX less than a year
ago, based on a ruling in a California District Court in Videckis
v. Pepperdine University, when two lesbian students who were
dismissed from the basketball team and university sued under
Title IX.45 Leading up to and after the landmark Obergefell
decision, there has been a sharp increase in requests by
religious educational institutions for exemptions from the Title
IX protections based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.46 In fact, for a span of ten years between 2003 and
2013, there was an average of only one claim for a religious
exemption per year.47 That number spiked in 2013, with fiftyseven claims in a span of two years, starting with the Arcadia
School District’s request based on a complaint by a transgender

43 Sex
Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409
(1975).
44 Title IX Protections from Bullying and Harassment in Schools, supra note 3.
45 Videckis v. Pepperdine University, 100 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
46 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12.
47 Resolution Agreement between the Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist., the U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. (July
24,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/07/26/arcadiaagree.pdf.
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student.48 All but one of these fifty-seven claims specified
gender identity and/or sexual orientation as the reason for
their exemption.49
Obviously religious educational institutions may request an
exemption to any part of Title IX, but this Note focuses on
statutes which prohibit sexual orientation and/or gender
identity discrimination in order to better understand and
suggest improvements to the current Title IX religious
exemption regulations. While the solutions proposed here will
protect those who are discriminated against based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, it will also improve the system
for anyone who is entitled to protection under Title IX.
III.

ENDA, THE UTAH COMPROMISE, AND FEHA

This Note seeks to parse out the weaknesses of the
language and application of Title IX religious exemptions, as
well as propose solutions to those weaknesses, by finding and
comparing similar statutes aimed at the same goal: balancing
religious freedom with necessary protection for LGBT
individuals. This Part explores the recent changes in various
employment and other non-discrimination laws that now
include sexual orientation as a protected class. First, this Part
will look at the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(“ENDA”), which the legislature introduced as a bill in every
Congress but one from 1994 to 2013 and which would have
created federal employment non-discrimination protections
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Second, this
Part will look at the so-called “Utah Compromise,” a state law
enacted in 2015 that increased religious freedom protections
while also providing employment and housing protections
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Then third, it
will examine the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)
enacted in California, which is one of the longest-standing
pieces of legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.
A. ENDA
ENDA, though never passed by Congress, represents a
48
49

Id.
Id.
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years-long effort by lawmakers to reach a nationwide
compromise between LGBT and religious communities to
ensure that the freedoms and liberties of all Americans are
protected in a way that is as fair and just as possible.50 ENDA
can serve as a partial model for updating Title IX religious
exemption language and applications, especially since it would
have amended Title VII, which is often referred to as a
synonymous standard with Title IX.51
First, this Subpart will lay out the basic language of ENDA,
as well as the language found in Title VII, with regard to
religious exemptions in the specific context of education. Then,
this Subpart will evaluate the differing perspectives on ENDA
and why it was ultimately retired for good, largely due to
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.52 Finally, this Subpart will
briefly discuss how identical language has been applied in
certain states and how that has impacted the protection of
religious freedoms and LGBT individuals in those states.
1. Language of ENDA
The ENDA language discussed in this Note will be that of
the most recent bill proposed in 2013 to the 113th Congress.
While the bill did not pass Congress, several states adopted the
exact language of ENDA, including Delaware and Nevada, the
two states this Note will address.53 The basic purpose of ENDA
was to “prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity.”54 The actual language of
the bill encompassed failing or refusing to hire, firing, or
otherwise discriminating against any employee because of his
or her “actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
identity.”55
Just as in Title IX, an exemption is provided for religious
organizations in ENDA’s text, as well as specific
acknowledgement of religious educational institutions in that
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
Goodman v. Archbishop Curley High Sch., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Md.
2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. CV RDB-15-0627, 2016 WL 3906640 (D. Md.
July 19, 2016) (holding that in evaluating Title IX claims, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit looks to case law interpreting Title VII).
52 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (2014).
53 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 711 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 613.330 (West);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.350 (West).
54 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, supra, note 50.
55 Id.
50
51
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exemption. ENDA states that the entirety of the Act shall not
apply to any organization or “educational institution or
institution of learning” that is already exempt from the
religious discrimination provisions of Title VII.56 This would
ensure that not only are religious exemptions already provided
for educational institutions under Title VII, but that they are
explicitly also acknowledged in reference to sexual orientation.
The Title VII language on religious exemptions works as a
different version of the “control test” mentioned above under
Title IX, and it even refers specifically to educational
institutions. In describing educational institutions, Title VII
includes a longer list than Title IX of the types of institutions
that might be eligible for an exemption, including a “school,
college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning.”57 The Title VII control test requires
that the educational institution 1) must be “in whole or in part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular
religion” or religious organization, or 2) must have a
curriculum “directed toward the propagation of a particular
religion.”58
The other language in Title VII, which defines “religious
employer” for purposes of applying the religious exemption
under ENDA, states that an exemption is granted to those
religious organizations (including educational institutions) in
the employment of individuals who adhere to the particular
religion of their organization and are performing work
“connected with the carrying on” of the religious organization.59
This language applies to anyone who might receive a religious
exemption when it comes to employment law, not just
institutions of higher education, and suggests that when an
employee of a religious organization is performing work which
by its nature requires him or her to be of that particular faith,
the organization is exempt from Title VII with regard to that
individual’s employment status.
2. Criticism of ENDA
There were several specific criticisms of ENDA which

56
57
58
59

Id. at § 6.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
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helped lead to its ultimate demise before Congress scrapped it
entirely. Conservatives and religious groups tended to be the
most likely to criticize ENDA, whereas those who supported
increased protection for the LGBT community were largely
supportive of ENDA.
For example, the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops critiqued ENDA on five grounds:
1) Lack of an exception for a “bona fide occupational
qualification” (“BFOQ”) which exists under every other
category of discrimination under Title VII except for
race;
2) Lack of a distinction between homosexual inclination and
conduct;
3) Support for redefinition of marriage;
4) Protection of “gender identity” allows individuals to
select their own sex in opposition with their biological
sex at birth; and
5) Religious liberty could be threatened by punishing the
religious or moral disapproval of same-sex conduct while
protecting only certain religious employers (i.e.
protecting only those who are part of an actual religious
organization, rather than religious individuals
operating businesses unrelated to their religious
beliefs).60
These points reflect concerns that likely would have been
held by many other religious freedom groups. When looking at
all of the critiques together, it appears that the overarching
concern was a threat of losing control over their own
organizations and the right to exclude (other than the
redefinition of marriage, which now would no longer be
relevant in light of Obergefell).61 Also, the concern that
religious individuals who run businesses unrelated to religion
would not be protected was well founded. Once the Supreme
Court issued the Hobby Lobby decision, LGBT advocacy and
liberal groups pulled out their support of ENDA.62
60 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Questions and Answers About
the Employee Non-Discrimination Act, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/humanlife-and-dignity/labor-employment/upload/enda-backgrounder-2013.pdf (last visited
May 11, 2016).
61 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015).
62 Jennifer Bendery & Amanda Terkel, Gay Rights Groups Pull Support for
ENDA Over Sweeping Religious Exemption, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2014, 8:28
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/enda-religious-
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In fact, initially many LGBT advocacy and liberal groups
supported ENDA, including the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the Transgender Law Center,
and Lambda Legal, but these groups abandoned support after
Hobby Lobby.63 This ruling held that the sincerely held
religious beliefs of a corporation’s owners are properly
attributed to the corporation as a whole.64 ENDA (and Title
VII) exemptions for religious corporations, associations,
educational institutions, or societies could then potentially
exempt any non-religious corporation or entity whose owners
held sincere religious beliefs from protections based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, leaving the exemption much
broader than originally intended.
Now ENDA is no longer an option for federal protections in
employment based on sexual orientation and gender identity,
mostly because Hobby Lobby broadened the exemptions
included in the bill to the point that the effect of the bill itself
completely changed. While this led to disapproval from both
sides, the removal of ENDA as a viable option for protecting
both religious and LGBT groups has opened the door to
creating an entirely new, and possibly better, solution.
3. Application of ENDA
While Congress never enacted ENDA, both Nevada and
Delaware have “control tests” for higher education religious
exemptions identical to ENDA’s control test.65 In 2002, when
ENDA was still under consideration, some were concerned that
caseloads would increase.66 However, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that the case load for the Employment
Opportunity Commission would only rise by 5 to 7% as a result
of ENDA.67 This was confirmed by the results in Delaware and
Nevada, where caseloads increased only minimally, based on a
exemption_n_5568736.html.
63 Id.
64 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (2014).
65 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 711 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 613.330 (West);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.350 (West); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S.
815, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
66 23 No. 12 Ind. Emp. L. Letter 4.
67 CBO Cost Estimate: S. 1284 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2002,
CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET
OFFICE
(June
13,
2002),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/13753.
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lack of cases on record.
Delaware included sexual orientation as a protected class in
various non-discrimination laws, enacted the language of
ENDA’s “control test” for higher education in 2009, and added
gender identity in 2013.68 This included discrimination in
employment, housing, public accommodations, and other
areas.69 Nevada added a prohibition of discrimination based on
sexual orientation in employment and public accommodations
in 1999, and added gender identity in 2011.70 In Delaware and
Nevada, both of which have language identical to ENDA’s with
regard to higher education, there are not any recorded cases
brought which challenge the religious exemption statute, nor
even any discrimination claims based on sexual orientation or
gender identity at all.71
This lack of contesting the religious exemption
requirement/control test language that was identical to ENDA
might show that the protections are working how they should
and are balancing religious liberties and LGBT protections in a
way that works for nearly everyone. It might also indicate a
lack of knowledge on the part of the general public, and
particularly of young students, of their right to protection and
the requirements that a school must meet in order to be
exempt from these requirements so as to have the “right” to
differentiate against them.
B. The Utah Compromise
The Utah Compromise was a ground-breaking piece of
legislation, mostly because Utah, which is headquarters to The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“the LDS
Church”), has historically been a very conservative and antigay state.72 The LDS Church worked with legislators to help

S.B. 121, 145th Gen. Ct. (Del. 2009).
Id.
70 Ed Vogel, Sandoval signs transgender job discrimination bill, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW
JOURNAL
(May
24,
2011,
1:39
PM),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/government/sandoval-signs-transgender-jobdiscrimination-bill (last visited May 11, 2016).
71 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 711 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 613.330 (West);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.350 (West); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S.
815, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
72 Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Utah “Compromise”
to Protect LGBT Citizens from Discrimination is No Model for the Nation, SLATE (Mar.
18,
2015,
3:18
PM),
68
69
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develop a bill that would protect religious freedom while also
expanding protection to LGBT individuals in employment and
housing.73 First, this Subpart will explore the language of the
bill. It will then examine the support and criticism that the
Utah Compromise has received from various groups. Finally, it
will explore the actual application of this new legislation and
how it has impacted the people of Utah.
1. Language of the Utah Compromise
The “Utah Compromise” was a modification of the current
Utah Antidiscrimination and Fair Housing Acts (“the Acts”).
Both “gender identity” and “sexual orientation” were added to
the lists of protected classes (race, gender, etc.) in the Acts.
This meant that both sexual orientation and gender identity
were “prohibited bases for discrimination in employment” as
well as in housing, though not considered protected classes in
general or in other legal contexts.74
Prior to these modifications, the Acts already had a unique
way of providing a substitute for a “religious exemption” to
religious groups. Instead of having a section detailing which
organizations qualify for a religious exemption, as ENDA did
and most other states do, the Utah Antidiscrimination Act
simply excluded religious groups from the definition of
“employer” altogether.75 The Utah Compromise added
additional exemptions from the definition of “employer” and
therefore increased the number of persons and entities not
subject to anti-discrimination laws.76
The current language of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act—
after the passage of the amendments listed in the Utah
Compromise—excludes the following from the definition of
“employer”: 1) any religious organization or religious
educational institution, including any religious leader “when
that individual is acting in the capacity of a religious leader,”

http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_the_utah_compromise_is_n
o_model_for_the_nation.html.
73 Linsey
Bever, Utah—yes, Utah—passes landmark LGBT rights bill,
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/03/12/utah-legislature-passes-landmark-lgbt-anti-discrimination-billbacked-by-mormon-church/?utm_term=.5f2ab1b54930.
74 S.B. 296, 60th Gen. Ct. (Utah 2015).
75 Utah Code Ann. § 16-61-102 (West).
76 Id.
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and 2) any organization considered to be an affiliate or
subsidiary of any religious organization and affiliate.77 The
main difference in the amended text from the original statute
was the addition of “religious leader” as excluded from the
definition of “employer.”
The inclusion of “religious leader” also required the addition
of its definition to the amended statute. The statute now states
that a “religious leader” is any individual who “is associated
with, and is an authorized representative of” a religious
organization, including members of the clergy and other
generally recognized types of religious leaders (priest, pastor,
rabbi, etc.). “Affiliate” is defined as a person who either controls
or is controlled by another specified person or in this case, by a
religious organization.78
Another addition to the statutes increased specific
protections for religious groups. The text dictating the addition
of these protections states that employees may express their
religious beliefs in the workplace as long as it is done in a
“reasonable, non-disruptive, and non-harassing way” and is on
equal terms with other similar types of expression of beliefs
allowed by the employer in the particular workplace. There is
an exception to this rule if the expression of beliefs would be “in
direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of
the employer.”79
In addition to protecting employees’ specific “right” to
express their moral beliefs and commitments in the workplace,
a section of the bill specifically creates protections for
employees who express their convictions outside of the
workplace.80 This section states that employers may not fire,
demote, refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate in relation to
the employment of individuals based on their “lawful
expression or expressive activity” which occurs outside of the
workplace, unless that expression “is in direct conflict with the
essential business-related interests of the employer.”81 It also
states that this type of expression includes “convictions about
marriage, family, or sexuality.”82
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The specific language mentioned above is not found in any
other state statute, and represents the greatest difference
between the Utah Compromise and legislative actions taken in
other states in that it not only provided additional protection
against discrimination based on gender identity and sexual
orientation, but also increased protection of religious freedom
and expression.
In addition to the amended language included in the above
paragraphs, which were part of bill SB 296, SB 297, introduced
at the same time and in conjunction with SB 296, included still
more protections for religious groups.83 The language in SB 297
is not necessarily relevant to the particular analysis in this
Note, but it is relevant to understanding what the LDS Church
and other conservative/religious groups in Utah required in
exchange for their support of extensions to anti-discrimination
protections to LGBT individuals.84
Among other things, SB 297 exempted clergy from
officiating at weddings, exempted religious organizations from
providing wedding services, protected conscientious objectors
from private suits and government penalties, exempted
religious marriage counseling courses and retreats, allowed
adoption/foster agencies to maintain existing placement
policies, required only willing clerks to issue marriage licenses,
disallowed revocation of professional/business license for
expression in a nonprofessional setting, and proactively
protected the character of religious buildings and wedding
services.85 Much of this legislation had previously been passed
in a variety of other states, though the requirement that only
willing clerks must issue marriage licenses had only been
passed
in
Delaware.
The
protections
regarding
professional/business licenses in nonprofessional settings and
protecting the character of religious buildings and wedding
services are unique to Utah.86
The language of the Utah Compromise is unique. It
increased protection for religious groups and for the LGBT
community at the same time, though in very different ways.
From a reading of the language and an analysis of the specific
S.B. 297, 60th Gen. Ct. (Utah 2015).
Bever, supra, note 73.
85 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Summary of the Utah Compromise (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584543.
86 Id.
83
84
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protections granted to religious groups and the LGBT
community, it appears that the Utah Compromise balances the
burdens and protections placed on both groups.
2. Criticism of the Utah Compromise
It is difficult to balance opposing interests and to evaluate
different procedures for balancing those interests. Many groups
expressed their support or criticism of the Utah Compromise.
Both sides offered criticism, but also support, particularly those
who tended to be more moderate in their approach to these
particular issues.
Particularly noteworthy is that the ACLU supported the
Utah Compromise, despite the sweeping increase in protection
for religious groups.87 However, it supported only SB 296,
which it believed was “crafted with the intent of delicately
balancing the rights of all Utahns to be treated fairly and
equally in housing and employment with the rights of religious
organizations to express beliefs.”88 The ACLU did not support
SB 297, because the ACLU believed it gave far too many
“protections” to religious groups and individuals at the expense
of LGBT individuals, and in a way that was fundamentally
unbalanced.89 In fact, Equality Utah—a prominent LGBT
advocacy group in Utah—stated that it was not even consulted
on SB 297, as it was on SB 296.90 Additionally, SB 297 affords
religious groups and individuals the ability to discriminate on
any grounds (i.e. not just based on gender identity or sexual
orientation, but also including race, gender, and all otherwise
protected classes).91 The ACLU encouraged Utah to reject SB
297, though it ultimately passed.92
Additionally, a group of law professors from Brooklyn Law
School and the University of Virginia Law School wrote an oped piece criticizing the Utah Compromise in its entirety.93 They
87 ACLU of Utah and Equality Utah Celebrate SB 296, Reject the Harmful
Provisions of HB 322, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 12, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-utah-and-equality-utah-celebrate-sb-296-rejectharmful-provisions-hb-322?redirect=lgbt-rights-religion-belief/aclu-utah-and-equalityutah-celebrate-sb-296-reject-harmful-provisions-h.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Tebbe, et al., supra, note 72.
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pointed out that many groups that withdrew support from
ENDA after Hobby Lobby—such as the ACLU and other LGBT
advocacy groups—did so because “it contained broad religious
exemptions similar to the ones in the Utah law.”94 They
claimed that this was probably because Utah already had
significantly fewer anti-discrimination protections in general
prior to the proposal of the Utah Compromise, and therefore
the inclusion of gender identity and sexual orientation as
protected classes in employment and housing seemed like a
much bigger step than it really was.95 They opined that this
amendment to the Utah Antidiscrimination Act merely brings
sexual orientation and gender identity up to the already subpar protections given to other classes (such as gender, race,
etc.) and that because the Utah Compromise only protects
LGBT individuals in employment and housing, and appears to
actually increase the protections afforded to religious groups
and individuals to discriminate against them in any other
setting, this was a step backward for the LGBT community in
Utah.96 They concluded by expressing that the Utah
Compromise was a step in the right direction and will increase
protections for LGBT individuals to an extent, but it should not
be considered a foundation or example for other states in
forming religious freedom and LGBT protection legislation.97
Unsurprisingly and somewhat ironically, many religious
leaders in the United States also felt that the protections
afforded here were not sufficient.98 These religious leaders
expressed concern over the same issues as the law professors
mentioned above: the Utah Compromise does not address
“whether individual business owners, based on their religious
beliefs, can refuse service to gay people or gay couples—for
example, a baker who refuses to make a cake for a gay
wedding.”99 These leaders include Russell Moore, president of
the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern

Id.
Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Laurie Goodstein, Utah Passes Antidiscrimination Bill Backed by Mormon
Leaders,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Mar.
12,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/utah-passes-antidiscrimination-billbacked-by-mormon-leaders.html?_r=1.
99 Id.
94
95
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Baptist Convention, as well as Roman Catholic Bishops.100 In
fact, the conclusions drawn are strikingly similar to those of
the law professors who believed LGBT protections were not
sufficient, with Dr. Russell Moore concluding that this bill
should not have been supported or passed, and absolutely
should not serve as a model going into the future for other
states or for the nation.101
These opposing sets of criticisms demonstrate the divide
that still exists between religious and LGBT advocacy groups,
but perhaps also indicate that this was an effective
compromise. It seems that generally both sides were happy
with what was accomplished, but felt that there was still much
left unsaid and left to be determined.
3. Application of the Utah Compromise
After the passage of the Utah Compromise, there appeared
to be an impact on Utahns in many different ways. Although
the question of whether individual business owners could
refuse to serve individuals based on their sexual orientation or
gender identity has not yet been answered, there were still
various positive outcomes that resulted from this legislation.
While there are not yet any reported claims brought under
the Compromise, the press has reported the story of a
transgender woman personally impacted by the law.102 Angie
Rice, an elementary school teacher, had already gone through
the male to female transition process, but only openly lived
that transition at home.103 While she was at school, she had to
conceal her identity as a female for fear of losing her job as a
special education teacher.104 After the passage of the Utah
Compromise, she was then able to be open about her gender
identity at her workplace and finally felt like she could truly be
herself in a place where she spent a majority of her day and

Id.
Id.
102 Compromise’s Effect on a Transgender Woman, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Nov. 10 2015, 6:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/utah-compromise-has-both-sidesseeing-a-way-forward-1447196349; see also Utah’s Complicated “Compromise” on Gay,
Religious Rights, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 10 2015, 8:09 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/video/utahs-complicated-compromise-on-gay-religiousrights/88DEAF1A-5C60-45ED-A5DD-9C1FC357BEE4.html.
103 Id.
104 Id.
100
101
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interacted with students and co-workers.105
The lack of court cases and controversy could most likely be
construed as a positive outcome of this legislation, as it shows
that there has generally not been too much public opposition
against it or a situation that would be considered legally
dubious. It is likely that there are others, like Rice, who
previously feared loss of a job or eviction from their homes, who
were finally able to be open about their sexual orientation
and/or gender identity while feeling assured that the law was
protecting them.
The Utah Compromise increased religious liberties and
LGBT protections at the same time, which allowed both sides
to feel more at ease, and hopefully achieved the result of
creating a less dichotomous society, but one that is supportive
of rights to live as one chooses and to believe as one wants to
believe.
C. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act
This Subpart will examine the employment and housing
anti-discrimination laws in the state of California, also known
as the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), because
California has been consistently ahead of the curve in passing
anti-discrimination legislation, and therefore has much more
foundation in case law and history to demonstrate the
effectiveness of FEHA, as compared to other states. First, this
Subpart will lay out the text of FEHA, then will examine some
of the support and criticisms of FEHA, and finally will examine
the case law and other results that have come from the
enactment of this law.
1. Language of FEHA
The earliest version of FEHA passed on September 18,
1959.106 Then in 1979, California became the second state to
protect against employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation in state employment, which then expanded to all
areas of employment in 1992.107 California became the third
state to include gender identity as a protected class in all

105
106
107

Id.
ROBERT D. LINKS, CAL. CIV. PRAC. CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION § 13:5 (2017).
Id.
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employment under FEHA in 2003.108 FEHA has also been
changed and amended over time, particularly in the sections
discussing religious exemptions. While it has more case law
than other states, there still is not much in the way of claims
brought based on religious exemptions alone—even outside the
scope of sexual orientation and gender identity.
FEHA begins by stating that it will apply to all employment
practices, unless they are “based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification.”109 FEHA then prohibits discrimination based on
“sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression . . . [and]
sexual orientation . . . .”110 It then uses very simple language
within the actual text to explain the grounds for a religious
exemption, which is simply that the term “‘employer’ does not
include a religious association or corporation not organized for
private profit” except as provided elsewhere in the statutory
definitions.111
In the definitions section of FEHA, a religious corporation
is defined as any corporation which was formed as a nonprofit
or religious nonprofit under the laws of formation of California,
or any “corporation that is formed primarily or exclusively for
religious purposes” under the laws of another state “to
administer the affairs of an organized religious group and that
is not organized for private profit.”112 Interestingly, it is further
clarified in the definitions that the term “employer” does
include a religious corporation when referring to employees of a
religious corporation who “perform duties, other than religious
duties, at a health care facility” which is operated by such
religious corporation “that is not restricted to adherents of the
religion that established the association or corporation.”113
Meaning, if a healthcare employer would otherwise be
considered a religious corporation or association, it does not
receive an exemption to FEHA if it caters to members outside
of its own religion and in application to its employees who do
not serve a religious function.
This particular definition section of FEHA also states that
any nonprofit public benefit corporation which is “formed by, or
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 (West).
Id.
Id.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926.2 (West).
Id.
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affiliated with, a particular religion” and “operates an
educational institution as its sole or primary activity” is
permitted to “restrict employment, including promotion, in any
or all employment categories to individuals of a particular
religion.”114 Notably, this gives religious educational
institutions the ability to discriminate on the basis of
employment, but only in the form of religious discrimination—
not sexual orientation or gender identity. Any other exemptions
to FEHA, beyond religious discrimination, for religious
educational institutions must meet the other requirements
identified above for a “religious corporation.”
2. Criticism of FEHA
There are various opinions about whether FEHA is
providing enough protection to LGBT individuals, and whether
the construction in FEHA of a religious corporation is too
narrow to provide sufficient protection for religious groups,
employers, and individuals. Similar to the Utah Compromise,
there is criticism from both sides of the spectrum.
In a law review article featured in the Journal of Catholic
Legal Studies, the author describes California’s statute as
defining religious corporations too narrowly.115 While in this
case she is specifically referring to contraception exemptions,
the arguments she provides apply in all situations.116 To her,
firstly, it is an insult to Catholics to narrowly define religious
institutions and corporations because it ignores the fact that a
Catholic’s religious beliefs are pervasive in every part of their
lives.117 She specifically refers to work in hospitals, nursing
homes, schools, and other public interest entities as being
religious work for those who identify as Catholic, rather than a
secular activity.118 She claims that requiring a primary purpose
of inculcating religious values or beliefs completely separates
acts of charity, a part of the Catholic faith, from consideration
as a religious activity worthy of protection.119
Additionally, her second argument is for the Catholic, the
Id.
Susan Stabile, When Conscience Clashes with State Law & Policy: Catholic
Institutions, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 137 (2007).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
114
115
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definition of a religious corporation—particularly under the
healthcare exception, the requirement that the institution only
serve members of their own faith—is of particular concern.120
Part of the Catholic belief system states that they are to go out
in the world and “spread the Gospel of Christ.”121 The article’s
author believes that narrowing the application of the religious
exemption to only institutions which serve their own
community ignores that part of their religious mission is to
create religious institutions which then inculcate Catholicism
in their employees and those who patronize the institution.122
In a law review article published in the Boston College
Journal of Law & Social Science, Erik S. Thompson argues just
the opposite.123 In fact, he points to the “healthcare exception”
in FEHA as a perfect example of how religious exemptions
should be framed on a federal level.124 He points out that this
protects anyone who identifies as LGBT who works in a
religious healthcare facility so long as he or she is not acting in
a pastoral or doctrinal function, and recommends that this be
extended beyond healthcare to include any other types of
religious organizations which offer “secular public services,
including
secondary
and
postsecondary
education,
125
humanitarian services, and adoption services.”
These criticisms demonstrate that there is still room to
improve protection for both groups, but also that reaching a
resolution becomes increasingly difficult as legislators get
closer to a more perfect balance.
3. Application of FEHA
There have been several cases brought in light of the
religious exemption provided by FEHA, though all resulted in a
ruling for the benefit of the defendant religious corporations,
rather than the plaintiff. For example, in Bohnert v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop Corporation, a Catholic high school
teacher brought a claim against the school based on a hostile
Id.
Id.
122 Id.
123 Erik S. Thompson, Compromising Equality: An Analysis of the Religious
Exemption in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and its Impact on LGBT
Workers, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 285 (2015).
124 Id.
125 Id.
120
121
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work environment when students took a picture underneath
her skirt.126 However, she failed to state a claim that the
religious exemption to FEHA did not apply because she herself
considered the Catholic high school to be a division of the
religious organization the Roman Catholic Archbishop
Corporation under FEHA’s definition of a religious
corporation.127 Because she did not claim that she was
employed by a separate non-religious organization or that the
Roman Catholic Archbishop Corporation was not a religious
organization, the battle was over before it began.128
Then in Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Tustin, a preschool teacher brought a claim against the school
for wrongful termination based on unmarried cohabitation.129
However, because the church operated the school as part of its
ministry and the school had no independent legal status apart
from the church, the preschool was lumped in with the church
and was considered exempt from FEHA.130 The court once
again ruled that there was a failure to state a claim.131
Finally, in Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation, an employee of
a religiously affiliated hospital brought suit against the
hospital for attempting to censor her religious speech.132 The
court held that because the conduct which had occurred in her
workplace was prior to the addition of the “healthcare
exception” to the religious exemption as stated above, the
employer had not been properly put on notice and there was no
cause of action.133
There is little in California which demonstrates the actions
of a plaintiff arguing that a particular employer does not
qualify for the religious exemption, and even when they have
done so, they have failed. However, presumably because of
cases like Silo, California decided to include a specific
exception to religious exemptions for healthcare institutions,
which has broadened the protections for those who are
126 Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1091
(N.D. Cal .2014).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin, 201 Cal. App. 4th
1041, 1045 (2011).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 27 Cal. 4th 1097 (2002).
133 Id.
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employees of religiously affiliated employers beyond the typical
scope of flat state religious exemption laws. Because of this
healthcare exception, employees who seek to perform secular
work at a religious institution are afforded the protections
against discrimination that would be provided in a secular
workplace, rather than narrower standards of protection that
are afforded to employees of religious corporations and
institutions.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF TITLE IX WITH ENDA
AND STATE STATUTES

This Note has analyzed the language, criticism, and
application of Title IX, ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and
FEHA regarding religious exemptions. While there are twenty
states—other than Utah and California—which currently have
employed anti-discrimination laws protecting individuals based
on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, this Note seeks to
draw conclusions from ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and
FEHA as these each respectively represent 1) a culmination of
work on the federal level; 2) a recent compromise which partly
appeased both religious and LGBT advocacy groups in a
culturally conservative state; and 3) a more detailed religious
exemption requirement enacted in a traditionally progressive
state. This Part will compare current Title IX regulations with
ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and FEHA to parse out what
has been effective and ineffective, and what might be done to
modify current Title IX regulations to better provide protection
for religious organizations and LGBT individuals in a way that
is more fair and equal.
As stated previously, there are three major problems
historically with the law and the application of Title IX
religious exemptions: 1) there is some ambiguity as to whether
a religious educational institution is entitled to an exemption
simply by its nature of being a religious educational institution,
or whether it is within the constitutional rights of OCR to
require an application or proof of claim prior to granting a
religious exemption; 2) a “controlling organization” is not really
required, despite it being a statutory requirement; and 3) an
explanation of a conflict between specific Title IX provisions
and specific tenets of the controlling religious organization is
not really required, nor is there any investigation into the

Duchene.249-284.docx (Do Not Delete)

276

5/31/17 5:09 PM

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2017

sincerity of the particular tenets put forth by the educational
institution. This Part will examine each of these problems
individually and, using ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and
FEHA as frameworks, will propose specific solutions to solve
these problems and create a better balance between protection
of religious educational institutions and LGBT students and
employees of those institutions.
A. Claim v. Apply and After-the-Fact Lawsuits
The first problem this Note seeks to address is the
ambiguity about “self-executing”: whether religious educational
institutions are inherently exempt from Title IX requirements
or whether they must actually apply to receive an exemption.
Additionally, if they must apply for and be granted an
exemption, can they do so after a lawsuit has already been filed
against them?
In ENDA and FEHA, case law assumed that religious
employers met the requirements; the burden of proof was on
the plaintiff to prove that the employer did not meet the
requirements for the exemption.134 All of this was determined
in court, after the suit had already been filed, and the religious
employer could use his or her status under the exemption as a
reason to move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. There
were no recorded cases in Nevada, Delaware, or Utah. In the
cases under FEHA in California, the plaintiffs were never able
to successfully show that an employer was not entitled to the
religious exemption. One might argue that this means the law
is doing its job at protecting the rights of religious employers—
but is it doing it too well and at the expense of individuals who
suffer unfair discrimination? In fact, one of the main concerns
of religious groups prior to the passage of ENDA was that case
load would dramatically increase. This has not occurred.
If no other anti-discrimination law has required a preemptive application to receive a religious exemption, why
would OCR have done so with Title IX? While it is not clear
what the intent of OCR is with regard to the claiming or
granting of religious exemptions, it is clear that it wanted to
make the exemption process narrower than in other areas of
existing law.
It is also clear that students are a particularly vulnerable
134

Henry, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 1045.
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population due to their age. In a law review article titled The
Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare
and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children
of Religious Objectors, James Dwyer argues that almost all
religious exemptions granted to educational institutions with
minor students should be revoked in order to promote and
maintain the basic welfare of children.135
While college students are generally not minors, they are
often still dependent on their parents and are at a particularly
vulnerable and confusing time of their lives. It is possible that
some students may have been persuaded to attend a religious
institution by their parents or decided to attend prior to
recognizing or openly expressing their sexual orientation or
gender identity. While the intention of OCR is not clear in the
more stringent process for obtaining religious exemptions in
the post-secondary setting, perhaps it is safe to assume that it
is best to broaden those protections to a greater extent than
those afforded to employees of religious entities. Just because
in employment law the burden is on the plaintiff to show that a
religious employer does not qualify for an exemption does not
mean that same burden should be placed on student plaintiffs.
If OCR wants to place this burden on students—as they
have in all previous suits where the exemption was granted
after the fact, then: 1) there should be an assumption that a
religious educational institution is entitled to a religious
exemption until proven otherwise (therefore negating the
dispute over claim versus apply) and 2) the qualifications for a
religious exemption must be clearer and, perhaps, narrower.
By applying to religious educational institutions the same
standards that other state anti-discrimination employment
laws have put into place, religious educational institutions will
have more certain protection in that they will be presumptively
exempt. Additionally, with knowledge that a religious
exemption presumptively exists, LGBT students will be more
likely to be on notice of the exemption and will be afforded
better protection overall by the clearer and narrower
qualifications.

135 James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child
Welfare and Education Laws As Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious
Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996).
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B. Control Test
While the existence of a control test is a common element
among ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and FEHA, as well as
Title IX, the requirements that must be met to pass the test are
the vaguest in Title IX. Making the requirements clearer would
make religious educational institutions more aware of what
standards they are required to meet and would ensure proper
compliance. Clearer requirements would also ensure that
LGBT students are afforded proper protection in situations
where the religious educational institution they attend should
not be given a religious exemption under the control test. There
are two different solutions that could each have a positive
impact on Title IX, as demonstrated by their various
applications in existing state law, and could be applied together
or separately: including a curriculum requirement and/or
requiring that all students of a religious university belong to
that particular religion.
1. Curriculum
The first solution reflects the language in ENDA and is
currently in use by Delaware and Nevada state law. It allows
for religious educational institutions to claim an exemption to
Title VII if they demonstrate 1) that they are either owned and
controlled by a religious corporation, or 2) that the curriculum
of the institution is “directed toward the propagation of a
particular religion.” As stated previously, there are no recorded
cases of suits brought in either Delaware or Nevada under
their versions of this statute. This would serve to replace part
of the third requirement in the current Title IX control test,
which requires that a religious educational institution is
considered controlled by a particular religious educational
institution if it so states in the charter, or if it is “committed to
the doctrines of a particular religion, the members of its
governing body are appointed by the controlling religious
organization, and it receives a significant amount of financial
support from the controlling religious organization.” Instead of
requiring financial support and appointment of the governing
body by the controlling religious organizations, the
requirement would simply be that the curriculum of the
religious educational institution propagate a particular
religion. This would clarify the requirements for religious
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educational institutions which are non-denominational and are
not affiliated with a particular official church entity, but do
espouse particular religious beliefs in their actual curriculum.
This first solution would substantially broaden the ability
of religious educational institutions to receive religious
exemptions, though not more so than they have received
historically, and would also clarify the requirements so that
OCR could continue to recognize exemptions for such schools
without violating the language of the Title IX control test.
2. Church member requirement
The second solution would require that all students and
employees at a particular religious educational institution
either belong to the controlling religious organization or
subscribe to the belief system based on the curriculum of the
religious educational institution. As stated above, FEHA
already has an exception for religious exemptions for religious
healthcare facilities. This exception requires that the employer
abide by FEHA and precludes religious exemptions for any
employees not in a ministerial role, unless the religious
healthcare facility requires that its patients and staff adhere to
the particular religious beliefs of the healthcare facility or its
controlling religious corporation. Thompson, in his law review
article mentioned above, argued that the extension of this
healthcare exception should apply to all religious public
interest institutions, including educational institutions, when
the institution is providing a secular service, and that this also
be included in ENDA. The contrasting opinion from the
Catholic Law Review article states that although the desire to
work in healthcare and perform other types of public service
can often stem from one’s religious beliefs, it does not
necessarily mean that the government should extend the right
to discriminate to any type of public interest institution that
performs secular work and happens to house employees who
have chosen that particular profession based on their religious
or moral values. This would lead to a system based on religious
versus secular motivations of employers and employees, rather
than a system based on clearly identifiable religious versus
secular work and organizations, and would completely erode
any ability for the government to distinguish between who
deserves protection and who does not.
While the Title IX control test allows religious educational
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institutions to claim a religious exemption based on the fact
that it “requires its faculty, students or employees to be
members of or otherwise espouse a personal belief in, the
religion of the [controlling] organization,” this is only one of
three ways to obtain a religious exemption. There are then two
different ways to apply this solution. The first would be to
make this a blanket requirement under the control test in
order to obtain a religious exemption; the educational
institution must require its students and employees to adhere
to a particular religious belief system.
Or, this could be applied in conjunction with the first
solution proposed. The language could be changed to reflect
three different options: a requirement that 1) the school is an
institution or department of divinity, 2) the charter states that
the institution is controlled by a specific religious organization,
or 3) the curriculum of the educational institution is directed
towards the propagation of a particular religion or belief
system and requires its students and employees to be members
of that religion or adhere to that belief system. This would still
allow for the inclusion of schools which are not controlled by a
specific religious organization, but would require these schools
to limit their students and employees to adherents of the belief
system propagated by the curriculum. This would then also
extend protection to students who attend religious educational
institutions that are not controlled by a particular religious
organization and do not require its students to adhere to a
particular religion. This solution would be more likely to
encourage religious educational institutions that are truly
propagating a particular religious belief system to come into
compliance, while those who are not so committed to a
particular religion or belief system would no longer be able to
discriminate against LGBT individuals.
C. Conflict with Tenets and Investigation of Sincerity
The third problem left to be solved in the Title IX
regulations is the requirement that a religious educational
institution specify which parts of Title IX it would like to be
exempted from and which particular tenets of its religion Title
IX is in conflict with. Similar to the issue in Subpart A,
whether an exemption should be claimed or applied for, there is
no particular requirement under ENDA, the Utah
Compromise, or FEHA which allows for only certain parts of
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the religious exemptions to apply to certain types of
discrimination (when looking at sex, gender, gender identity,
and sexual orientation). It functions generally as a blanket
exemption from all discrimination claims as long as a religious
employer meets the religious exemption test.
There are, however, often cases where the sincerity of the
institution’s particular religious beliefs comes into question.
When determining whether particular tenets of a religion are
in conflict with particular requirements of Title IX, it is
essential to look into the sincerity of the institution’s belief and
adherence to a tenet it is claiming is in conflict with the Title
IX requirement.
In a Stanford Law Review article discussing the
constitutional limits of investigating the sincerity of religious
beliefs, Ben Adams and Cynthia Barmore explain that there is
some room for courts to look into the sincerity of beliefs in two
circumstances: 1) to see if there is a motive to make an
insincere claim of belief, and 2) to see if the claimant’s behavior
is contradictory to the claim made and therefore would
constitute fraud.136 As mentioned previously, there was never
any sort of action on the part of OCR to determine if the tenets
offered up as contradictory to Title IX requirements were really
the tenets subscribed to by the educational institution. If it was
assumed that religious educational institutions are entitled to
a religious exemption, this would remove any need for OCR to
investigate any insincerity in the claims of these educational
institutions, or to investigate anything at all. However, if a
student or employee of a religious educational institution
brings a suit, it would be entirely appropriate for the plaintiff
to make a claim that the way in which he or she had been
discriminated against was not contradictory to the tenets of the
educational institution (if they in fact conceded that the
educational institution met the requirements of the control
test).
However, these religious tenets should be mandatory in the
particular religion of the religious educational institution in
order to qualify. For example in a FEHA case, a Jehovah’s
Witness brought suit against his employer for wrongful
termination when he skipped work to attend a religious

136 Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts
After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2014).
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conference.137 The employer attempted to use the fact that this
was not a mandatory religious requirement and that the
employee had skipped the conference the previous year as
evidence that the claim was based on an insincere religious
belief.138 The plaintiff won the suit, however, as the court held
that a religious act need not be mandatory for it be sincere.139
This type of thinking about sincerity of religious belief opens
the door to a religious educational institution claiming any sort
of belief, even if it is simply a guideline or cultural religious
belief. Having a requirement that the particular tenet be a
permanent and mandatory part of a religious belief system
affords better protection for LGBT individuals and provides
clearer guidelines for religious educational institutions. In fact,
if the second solution offered in Subpart B—that any religious
educational institution which is entitled to an exemption must
require that its students and employees adhere to a particular
religion or belief system—was required in every religious
educational institution, then this requirement that a religious
tenet be mandatory in a particular religion would make even
more sense.
V.

CONCLUSION

These solutions seek to create a better balance of protection
for religious educational institutions and LGBT students and
employees of these institutions. There would likely be
arguments on both sides about why protections are too limited
for both groups, but this is where the Utah Compromise has
perhaps offered one of the most effective ways to deal with this
problem. While it might appear that religious educational
institutions are constrained in their ability to discriminate,
perhaps an additional solution is one in which religious
students and employees are offered more protection at secular
institutions. This was what the Utah Compromise sought to
accomplish: while legislators might somewhat limit the
abilities of employers to discriminate, they are going to liberate
the individual. This is exactly what is proposed by this Note:
that the government narrow protections on large organizations
137 California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n v. Gemini Aluminum Corp.,
122 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1011 (2004).
138 Id.
139 Id.
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and improve protections for individuals—whether that be
based on sexual orientation discrimination or religious
discrimination.
In fact, the greatest example of this concept from the Utah
Compromise was when the LDS Church and LGBT advocacy
groups counseled together with legislators in order to try and
reach a fair compromise on SB 296. This cooperation was more
unique than the language of the law itself, or even its
application. If religious institutions of higher education could
come together with LGBT advocacy groups and with OCR and
other federal legislators and come to a resolution to balance
protections for religious educational institutions and LGBT
individuals, then maybe a new law and process used by OCR to
enforce Title IX could be agreed upon in a way that will create
the best possible balance of protection for everyone.
Based on an analysis of Title IX, ENDA, the Utah
Compromise, and FEHA, the resolution that works best for
everyone might exist in the form of the solution proposed in
this Note. First, the debate over whether religious institutions
claim or apply for exemptions would finally come to a close;
religious exemptions would be assumed until proven otherwise
by a plaintiff. Second, the control test would be clarified;
religious educational institutions may now use a curriculum
directed toward the propagation of a particular religion as
sufficient for qualifying for an exemption, however these
institutions must require that all students adhere to the
religious belief system of the institution. Third, religious
educational institutions would still be expected to discriminate
only based on certain parts of Title IX and only if it truly
conflicted with a particular mandatory tenet espoused by the
controlling religious organization or curriculum.
This solution both broadens and narrows the protections for
religious educational institutions and LGBT individuals, but
most importantly it clarifies the requirements for religious
exemptions to Title IX so that both institutions and individuals
might better be able to claim the rights and protections that
are afforded to them.
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